Hespéris-Tamuda, Vol.XXX, Fasc.2 (1992), pp. 17-35.

SHARIFISM AND THE SHARIF-S IN THE REIGN 0F MUHAMMAD B. ABDALLAH (1757-1790)

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All states resort to ideologies to justify or defend their existence. The foundations of these ideologies of legitimacy which mobilize tradition, divine grace or the law are laid down by the state and by the elite whose purposes the state serves[1].

The reign of Muhammad b. Abdallah, which constituted a new departure for the Alawi dynasty, represents an ideal moment for observing the legitimating ideologies at work. It was a phase of reconstruction of the state which had been virtually disintegrated by thirty years of civil strife. After the failure of the Ismaili model of government whose legitimating ideology was based on military strength, a new equation of power had to be worked out. The religious elite which had been marginalized by Mawlay Ismail became an important element in the legitimating process. However, with state-building and centralization as a foremost concern, Sidi Muhammad soon realized that it was imperative for him to appropriate the domain of the religious elite and establish his own authoritative interpretation of his Islamic obligations as head of state; whence the competition between state and religious elite over the elements of legitimacy and the need for Sidi Muhammad to constantly redefine and justify state power.

The present article is an attempt to show how sharifism, one of the legitimating ideologies of the Alawi dynasty, was reflected in the policy of Sultan Muhammad b. Abd Allah and the social practice of the religious elite.

DEVELOPMENT 0F THE SHARIFIAN CULT

In l8th century Morocco the individual’s way of life in both its personal and social aspects was regulated by the *shari'a* and its guardians. It was also shaped by entrenched popular beliefs and practices which remained outside the scope of orthodox religion. One of these practices, the veneration of

(1) On the topic of legitimation see Enc Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition,* Cambridge, 1983; Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* Boston, 1973; Findley, “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East” in *Studia Islamica, 55,* 1982; and E. Hobsbawn, “The Social Function of the Past” in *Past and Present, 55,* May 1972.

the descendants of the Prophet, was so much part of popular culture and scholarly discourse that it came to have the force of religious belief. Members of the Prophet's House *(ahl al-bayt* or *sharif-s)* enjoyed a privileged place in society while sharifian ideology served to mold social values and shape norms of religious and political legitimacy. There was hardly any aspect of social or religious activity which did not bear the mark of sharifian influence. This was particularly true of the politico-religious institutions.

Sharifism conferred upon the holder of the title a special status which was often compared to that of European aristocracy[2]. But to their nobility of blood, the *Sharif-s* associated a special place in the religious hierarchy. As the people of the Prophet's blood, the *sharif-s* are privileged by God who promised them eternal blessing and safeguard from hell[3]. Love of *ahl-bayt,* a natural extension of the love of the Prophet, is a duty recommended by the scriptures. In fact their glorification forms part of the Muslims' daily rituals[4]. The *Sharif-s* are also distinguished from the rest of the community of believers by being endowed from *bayt al-mal* and not from the *zakat* which is considered as "the unclean part" of others' property[5]. This endowment was meant to prevent them from exercising demeaning functions and degrading crafts and to enable them to occupy their rank with dignity[6].

They were, moreover, permitted relative administrative and judicial autonomy under the authority of their *naqib,* a sort of marshal of nobility. The *naqib,* himself a *Sharif,* was chosen by the sharifian group to whom he belonged in order to protect the sharifian lineage, serve as the representative of the whole group before the makhzan, and act as the supreme arbiter in intra-sharifian conflicts[7~]

In society, the *Sharif-s* were looked upon with great reverence. For the simpleminded *amma* as for the sophisticated scholars, the *Sharif-s* represented the most concrete link with God's messenger and the door to divine blessing. Their intercession was sought every time the community was faced with natural calamities or human injustice. They constituted, thus, an important element in the society's spiritual equilibrium.

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(2) Laroui, A., *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912),* Paris, 1977. A. Sebti uses the term "aristocracy" with certain reservations; see his "Sharifisme citadin, charisme et historiographie", *in Annales ESC,* Mars-Avril 1986, No.2, pp.433-[57].

(3) "God will remove the stains of you O people of the House and purify you completely" (Quran, S.32, v.33).

(4) The glorification of *ahl al-bayt* is part of the *tashahhud* (profession of faith) which the Muslim pronounces at least five times a day on the occasion of the daily prayers.

(5) At-Tawdi b.Suda and Umar al-Fasi, *Ahkam az-Zakat,* Ms.1656, Sbihiya Library, Sale.

(6) The advantages and privileges accorded to *ahl al-bayt,* particularly under the 'Abbasid-s, were also meant to dissuade the *sharif s* from joining the she's party as this is attested by a *zahir* of nomination of a naqib of the 9th century, quoted by Ibn Zaydan in *al- Izz wa as-Sawla* (2 volumes), Rabat, 1961-62, vol.!, pp.'[7]5-[78].

(7)Al-Hawwat, *as-Sirr az- Zahir,* lith., Fes, 1932, p.8

But who was *Sharif* in Morocco? Was considered *a Sharif* anyone who could produce a genealogy tracing his descent back to the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima, his cousins ‘Ali and Afar or his uncles al-’Abbes and Hamza[8], provided that this genealogy was endorsed by public opinion and the official genealogist (the *naqib),* and ascertained by the highest religious institution through a certificate delivered by the sultan himself[9].

For historical reasons, however, the *sharif-s* in Morocco refer almost exclusively to the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and his cousin ‘Ah b. Ali Taliban (i.e. ‘Ali’s branch), to the exclusion of the descendants of the Prophet’s uncles ’Abbes and Hams and his cousins (Ali's brothers) ‘Ail and Ja’far[10]. Thus, a twentieth century *naïf* and historian of the Alawi dynasty Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Zaydan, defined the *sharif-s* exclusively as “the descendants of Fatima az-Zahra and the Imam Ali. Abe Tâlib”[11]. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of the cult of the descendants of Ali and d Fatima as a major component of Moroccan Islam among which:

1. The foundation of the first Muslim State in Morocco by Idris b. Abdallah (d.788), an Alid *sharif* and a partisan of Zaydi shiism[12]. Indeed the Zaydiyya believed that Ali’s descendants were the only true *Sharif-s* and worthy successors of the prophet at the head of the Islamic community, thus excluding the other branches of the Banu Hashim who formed the Prophet’s large family, most notably the ‘Abbasid-s against whom they had rebelled. The Idrisi state they founded in the Islamic far West was, in a way, a revenge for the descendants of ‘Air who were dispossessed of political power in the Arab East and forced to disperse after the battle of Fakhkh in 786 AD. Indeed, the Idrisi-s claimed the title of imam, called their capital “a1-’A1ia” and minted the name of AIi on their coins beside that of the Prophet Muhammad. These signs of *tashayyu’*, however, remained Limited to political ideology with little repercussion on the religious creed[14]. However, the cult of the Alid branch of *ahl al-bayt* remained alive and so did the mahdi tradition it had introduced.

2. The second element which might have also contributed to the development of the cult of the Alid *sharif-s* in spite of the triumph of orthodox Sunnism in Morocco was the *mahdi* tradition which survived in southern Morocco in particular. Indeed, despite the repugnance of orthodox

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(8) Ibid.

(9) The act delivered by the sultan, *Zahir at-Tawqir wa al-Ihtiram* recommended the *sharif to* the veneration of the population and accorded him tax immunity or any other privileges. It constituted a sort of “act of nobility”.

(10) Although representatives of the other branches of the Prophet’s House do exist in Morocco (the Nasiri-s of Tamegrut, for example, claim descent from Jaafar b. Abi Talib), only the descendants of Ali figure in the various registers of Moroccan *Sharif-s* and profit of the advantages offered to this caste.

(11) Ibn Zaydan, *al-Izz,* vol. I, p.l68.

(12) Gannun A., *1)Dhikrayât Mashahir Rijal al-Maghrib,* No.33, Beirut, n.d., p.6.

(13) Brignon et.al, H*istoire du Maroc,* Casablanca-Paris, 1968, pp.59-71. According to the authors of this work, coins were found on which the profession of Mahdism was inscribed.

(14) Pre-Marinid sources often attached qualifications such as “shii”, “zaydi” or “fatimi” to describe the founder of the Idrisi dynasty. See on this subject Herman Beck, *L’image d’Idris II, ses descendants de Fas et la population sharifienne des sultans marinides (1258-1 465),* Brill, Leiden, 1989.

ulama to the idea of the *mahdi* numerous traditions attributed to the Prophet were found in support of this belief. According to one of these *hadith-s* "there must appear at the end of Lime a man from the *ahl al-bayt* who will aid the Faith and make justice triumph; that the Muslims will follow him and that he will reign over the Muslim kingdoms and be called the *nzahdi"*[15]. Some traditions, related in particular by the Andalusian *alim* al-Qurtubi (d.1272) in his *Tadhkirat*, have even made this *mahdi rise* in Massa in the Sous[16]. The Almohad experience and the recurrent appearance over the centuries, including the l8th century[17], of claimants to this title helped keep alive the tradition of expectation of the *"mahdi al-Fatimi*, a sort of Sunni version of the shii concept of the "hidden i*mam"*.

3. The third factor was the Marini religious policy based on the consolidation of sunnism and the promotion of sharifism both as a counter-weight to the emerging force of Sufism and as a means of undermining Almohad ideology.

If sharifism was, in one form or another, present in the ideologies of the various dynasties which governed Morocco since the Idrisi-s[18], the Marini-s and the Wattasi-s placed the *Sharif-s* in such a privileged position that they appeared as the pillars of their political system and the warrants of its legitimacy[19]. Through the officialization of the Prophet's birthday *(mawlid)* celebrations, the discovery of the tombs of Idris I in 1318 and Idris II in 1437, the creation of the *zawiya* of the *Sahrif-s* in Fes, as well as through the numerous privileges accorded to the Prophet's descendants, the Marini sultans contributed greatly to the spectacular resurgence of the sharifian cult. The *Idrisi Sahri-fs* who had until then lived in hiding *(tasattur)* were systematically sought out by the MarTnT-s[2°] rehabilitated, and granted a privileged position in society. The population, which was always receptive to the idea of the "divinely guided *mahdi*, introduced by the Idrisi-s and later developed by the Almohad-s and the Sufis, responded *en masse* to this sharifian renaissance. For Marini and Wattasi rulers, the cult of the *ahl al-bayt* -- who in Morocco corresponded to "*ahl 'Ali"* -- was a substitute for Almohad mahdism and at the same time a means of domesticating the rising power of popular Sufism which rested also on the glorification of the Prophet and his family. For the common people, the sharifian cult was welcomed as a return to the Prophet and a hope for deliverance from the political and moral crises of the Islamic West during the l5th century.

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(15) There is no mention of the *Mahdi* in either the Quran or the authenticated hadith-s. See discussion of this issue through the Prophet's tradition in Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqaddima*, Beirut, n.d., pp.311-330. See also the article "Made" in Gibb and Kramers (Eds), Shorter *Encyclopedia of Islam*. BrilI, Leiden, 1974, pp.310-313.

(16) Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddima*, p.3l1.

(17) This is illustrated by the numerous risings witnessed in the Sous, some of which are related in the monumental work of al-Mukhtar as-Susi, *al-Maasul* (20 vols.), Casablanca, 1961, vol.14, p.22.

(18) Sharifism was sometimes used negatively when associated with shiism, at other times it was used as a justification for the claim to the caliphate, and in other instances as an instrument of unification of a heterogeneous population which tribal ' *sabiyya* alone could not assemble within a large empire.

. (19) Mohamed Kably, "Musahama fi Tarikh aI-Ashraf" in *Majallat kulliyat al-A dab*, Rabat, 1968, Nos.3-4, pp.7-19.

(20) The Marine-s organized a first survey of the *sharif-s* in 1310 with the object of "getting acquainted with their locations" *(at-ta'arruf 'ala mawaqi'ihim);* see copy of this survey in Ms.D/723, BGR.

4. The fourth element which contributed to the assimilation of the Alid cult by Moroccan Islam was the spread, starting with the fifteenth century, of a Sufi-Jihadï ideology, that is the Shadhili-Jazuli *tariqa.* This Sufi way which progressively came under the influence of *Sharif-s,* relied heavily on the veneration and glorification of the Prophet and the *ahl al-bayt* and mobilized the population for the defense of *dar al-Islam* as Marini-Wattasi rule weakened[21]. Sharifism was presented by this Sufi movement as "an alternative principle of sanctity"[2~] and Sufism accepted by the *Sharif-s* as an "esoteric caliphate" *(al-khilafa al-batiniya)* ~. In alliance with the Sufi movement, the *Sharif-s* found renewed vitality in leading the community again, as *jihad* leaders and also as restorers of true Islam. Soon, the concepts of *sharaf* and *tasawwuf* fused; the *Sharif-s* organized themselves in *ribat-s* to back their claim as defenders of the threatened faith, and the Sufi leaders produced sharifian pedigrees to justify their claim to spiritual leadership[24]. In a sense, the *Sharif-s* furnished the ideology and the Sufis the organizational framework of a movement which would eventually lead to the return of the *sharif-s* to power in the l6th century (25).

REPRODUCTION 0F SHARIFIAN IDEOLOGY

The rise of the *Sharif-s* as a major political force and the emergence of sharifism as an important ideological stimulus were thus confirmed by the Shadhili-Jazuli movement since the l5th century. The importance acquired since by the *sharif-s* in the Moroccan socio-political structure did not reside so much in their quality as descendants of the Prophet as it did in the value attached to this qualification by those who established the society's norms: the religious scholars, the Sufi orders and the sharifian makhzan. Sharifian ideological hegemony in society was not the result of an independent action by the *Sharif-s* as a separate group but rather the product of a diffused influence they indirectly exercised through the religious establishment but also through the sharifian makhzan.

While sharifian ideology permeated the whole social tissue, the *sharif-s* were represented in power only by one fraction of the group. So, in order to apprehend the role of the *sharif-s* in l8th century Morocco, it is fundamental to understand how each

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(21) Kably, "Musahama", p.16; the *sharif-s* had also become disillusioned with the last Marini sultans who, pressed by defense expenditures, reduced or interrupted their usual donations to the *sharif-s.*

(22) Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed,* University of Chicago Press, 1971, p.47.

(23) "For the worldly caliphate *(al-Khilafa ad-dunyawiyya)* they had Lost, God compensated them with a spiritual caliphate *(al-khilafa al-batiniya)";* aI-Hawwat, *as-Sirr,* p.29.

(24) It was starting this period that Sufi leaders became concerned with the founders' lineages which were either found to be the Prophet's blood, of that of his companions (the Dilai rulers claimed descent from the Caliph and Prophet's companion Abu-Bakr, and the Sharqawi-s from the Caliph Umar), or at least from the Prophet's tribe, Quraysh. It was also starting this period that Mawlay Abd as-Salam b. Mashish was given much importance in the history of Moroccan Sufism.

(25) Before the advent of the Saadi dynasty, the Idrisi sharif-s had founded two principalities; that of Fes lasted from 1465 to 1471, and the Banu Rashid reigned over the principality of Shefshawin from 1471 until the establishment of Saadi rule in *1509.*

is fundamental to understand how each Sharifian sub-group -- scholars, Sufis and makhzan -- perceived their function in the socio-political system.

(a) A Sharifian alim: SuIayman al-Hawwat

Sulayman a1-Hawwat (d.1816) is an ideal spokesman of a *sharif-s* since he was *naqib* of the prestigious Idrisi *sharif-s* of northwestern Morocco (the Alami-s), and possessed at the same time the scholarly and literary skills of a great *alim* that allowed him to express the concerns of his km.

Thamarat Unsi, the autobiography which this alim from Shefshawin wrote in 1791 for the intention of his children who were born and brought up in Fes26, represents a typical self-image of an eighteenth century sharifian ‘a7im profoundly conscious of belonging to a prestigious lineage. It also illustrates the role that such an alim can play in perpetuating sharifian ideology and point out the intricacies of the sharif-s relations with each other, with the alim-s, the Sufi orders and with the sharifian makhzan.

Through the biography of this sharifian *alim*, sharifian status is perceived as a destiny, a sort of divine mission. The life story of Sulayman’s father, like his own, is presented by the author as perpetual manifestations of Divine Providence. The father, Muhammad al-Hawwat (d.1748), was an accomplished poet, a successful judge and a devoted Sufi who settled in Tamegrut for years upon the demand of the Nasiri *shaykh* Ahmad al-Khalifa (d.1717). Thus, to his illustrious and unquestionable sharifian lineage and his scholarship, he added an attachment to Sunni Sufism. No wonder that his *baraka* remained active even after his death[27]. Sulayman’s mother did not belong to the Prophet’s lineage, but she was nevertheless found to have an affiliation with the Prophet’s tribe, Quraysh. She did not share in the “high sharifism” *(ash-sharaf al-khass)* of the Prophet’s progeny, but was able to claim a “lower sharifism” *(ash-sharaf al-amm)*[28]. The marriage of Sulayman’s parents, his conception, his birth and even his name, are presented as the work of Providence and the result of the intervention of saints[29].

The death of the father shortly after the birth of Sulayman is also presented as a symbol which associates the author to the Prophet Muhammad who was also brought up as an orphan. Like the Prophet’s family, the Hawwat-s were not poor, but it was the status of Sulayman as *sharif* and son of *alim* and a Sufi which constituted a sort of guarantee for his future. The celebration of his memorization of the *Quran (khatm)* was a major event in Shefshawin for it was attended by the city’s

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(26) Al-Hawwat, *Thamarat Unsi* , Ms. 11861, Bibliotheque Hassaniya de Rabat.

(27) *Ibid.,* p16.

(28) Ibid., p.l2-l[3]. Linguistically, however, the name of the mother -- Makhzan -- would rather suggest a Berber origin.

(29) The marriage of SuIayman’s parents was apparently the work of the Malamati shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Majdhub (d.1569) and the *‘alim of* Shefshawin, Abd Allah al-Habti (d.1556) *(Ibid.* pp.l3, 15 and 16). The *baraka* of Mawlay Abd Assalam b. Mshish and Sidi Yusuf at-Tadili was at the origin of the conception of Sulayman (p15); and the name was suggested to the father in a premonitory vision (p.16).

was attended by the city's Makhzan governor Said b. al-Ayyashi[30]. In the sharifian *zawiya* of Tazrut where al-Hawwat received part of his education, he was received with great honors by his Raysuni "cousins"[3] . The *shaykh* of the Tamegrut Nasiri *zawiya* also extended to the son the same consideration his predecessors had for the father who had lived and taught in Tamegrut for many years. Thus, when Yusuf b. Nasir visited Shefshawin in 1757, the first person he inquired about and asked to see was the son of Muhammad al-Hawwat[32].

As a student in Fes, Sulayman did not lead the normal life of an outsider *(afaqi)* student. Although he lived with his peers in the Attarin *madrasa,* he refused to accept the *hubus* donations in the form of food made to the students residing in these students halls and had constantly a member of his family or a slave at his service[33]. The *sharif-s* and *ulama* of Fes who appreciated Sulayman's distinguished lineage but who also respected the scholarship and piety of his father, welcomed the young al-Hawwat in their courses and their homes and accorded him friendship and hospitality. The historian and genealogist Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Qadiri (d.1773) dedicated much of his free time to introducing Sulayman al-Hawwat to the science of *ansab* (genealogy). Umar al-Fasi(d.1774) accepted him readily in his highly selective circle of students where rational sciences and speculative theology were discussed[35]. Ziyyan al-'Iraqi (d.1780), a Husayni *Sharif* and an eminent specialist of Arabic grammar and literature, considered him "as one of his sons"[36]. 11e not only encouraged his interest in the literary arts but was also involved with Sulayman's marriage and settlement in Fes[37]. The rich families of Fees also vied for the friendship of this alum Sharif. The Benelux-s who became his in-laws, found in Suleiman the most effective means of protection against makhzan exactions[38].

After receiving the i*jaza-s* of the most outstanding scholars of his time, Sulayman al-Hawwat taught and delivered *fatwa-s* in Fes and Shefshawin, refusing to get paid for either of these services. Moreover, his pride in being a nobleman and a distinguished scholar made him reject al proposals to assume political or even religious functions for fear of "dishonoring" himself and "soiling his lineage"[39]. For the same reasons, Sulayman refrained from acting as "state-Sharif" or "conflict mediator" attached to the court. His distinguished sharifian pedigree allowed him to refuse the missions assigned to him by

(30) Ibid., pp.l8-l9.

(31) The shaykh of the Raysuni *zawiya* often told his visitors that he was in communication with the spirit of Muhammad al-Hawwat; Ibid. pp.34-35.

(32) Ibid., pp.26-2[9].

(33) Al-Hawwat, *ar-Rawda al-Maqsuda,* Ms. K/2341, Bibliothèque Générale de Rabat, BGR pp.184-l85.

(34) *Thamarat,* pp.38-39.

(35) Ibid., pp.40-[4]1.

(36) Ibid., p.2[9].

(37) Ibid., p.37.

(38) Ibid., pp.38-3[9].

(39) Ibid., pp.40-41.

Sultan Sidi Muhammad, counting on the one hand on this latter's magnanimity and, on the other hand, on his own *baraka* to protect him from the anger of the temporal authorities (*uli al-amr*)[40].

This and the fact that he disapproved of many aspects of Sidi Muhammad's administration did not prevent him, however, from visiting the Sultan, flattering him and the princes with verses of poetry or "fraternizing" with the Alawi *alim-s* with whom he shared scholarship and a distinguished sharifian lineage. Neither did he hesitate to express his admiration for Sidi Muhammad's sharifian policy which he readily compared to that of the shii kings of Persia[41]. This attitude vis-à-vis the sharifian state which ai-I~1aww~t qualifies as *khumûl*[42], or a desire for self-effacement, looks in fact more like a sense of honor and a will to impose himself as a nobleman.

Sulayman al-Hawwat was indeed very proud of belonging to one of the most illustrious and the purest sharifian lineages in Morocco. He never tired of exposing his sharifian pedigree *(amud an-nasab)* which he presented as being one of the shortest, and thus closest to the Prophet[43]. This lineage was his most precious capital and he was very anxious to preserve it from anything that could demean or soil! Al-Hawwat was also conscious that without his father's or his own scholarship his *sharaf* would not have been more than a local appellation. It is only when allied to science, piety and urban culture that sharifism becomes a universal value.

(b) Sharifian Sufism: the Wazzani Zawiya

Sharifian ideology was also vehicled and promoted by the Sufi orders in general and by the sharifian *zawiya-s* in particular. The Wazzani *zawiya* exemplifies the fusion between Sufism and sharifism. Its foundation in the mid-seventeenth century by an Idrisi *Sharif* of Jabal al-Alam, Abdallah b. Ibrahim (d.1678), occurred at a time when the young Alawi dynasty was consolidating its authority and when sharifism was, once again, imposing itself as an essential element of political Legitimacy.

The appearance of Mawlay Abdalah ash-Sharif as a renewer of Shadhili-Jazuli Sufism also came as a confirmation of the essential role played by the Idrisi *Sharif-s* in the history of Moroccan Sufism. Having been deterred from political power in favor of the newly arrived *sharif-s* of the south, the Idrisi-s dedicated their zeal and charisma to the spiritual leadership of the community of believers. It was as if a certain compromise had been reached between the two main divisions of the Moroccan *sharif-s:* the 'A1awi-s of the south appropriated power *(al-khilafa ad-dunyawiya)* while the Idrisi-s of the north assumed spiritual guidance *(al-khilafa al-batiniyya).*

(40) Ibid., pp.34-37.

(41) Al-Hawwat, *as-Sirr*, p.5.

(42) The attitude of *khumul* or occultation adopted by ulama and Sufis as a means of self effacement and retreat from public life is adopted here by a1-flaww~t who considered that the exercise of power ~oiled his holy lineage.

(43) Ibid., p.41 and *as-Sirr*, p.12. Al-Hawwat presents his pedigree as an exception to the rule set up by Ibn Khaldun according to which one should count on an average of three ancestors for every hundred years; in the case of the al-i1aws~t-family who marry after the age of *35*, the average is less than three.

The history of the Wazzani religious order, more than any other Moroccan *zawiya*, has been dominated by sharifism. Conceived at its creation as a Sufi institution aimed at reforming society through spiritual reform, the Wazzani *zawiya* evolved rapidly into an instrument for the propagation of sharifian ideology. Its structure was that of a *zawiya* with its founding *shaykh*, its *tariqa*, its Sufi chain of transmission *(sanad)*, its mother *zawiya* and its disciples and brothers *(ikhwan)* organized in affiliate local *zawiya-s* and dedicated to the propagation of the *wird* and teachings of the *shaykh*. The content of the doctrine taught by the *zawiya*, however, underwent a gradual change since the death of the founding *shaykh*. The Sufi dimension of the order faded away progressively in favor of sharifism, which became the predominant aspect of the *zawiya* teachings. From a Sufi guide, the head of the Wazzani religious order turned into a "*baraka* dispenser" and a manager of his forefathers' wealth and charisma[45].

The mystical career of Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif began in a retreat near Wazzan as a disciple of Sidi Ali b.Ahmad as-Sarsari (d.1621) from whom he obtained the authorization *(idhn)* to teach the Jazuli *tariqa*. Not contented with this authorization, he sought confirmation of his call by imposing upon himself a period of seclusion from mankind which he spent in prayer and supplication. This retreat culminated in his "mystical revelation" *(al-fath)*, i.e. the permission of the Prophet to go into the world and start preaching his Sufi way[46].

The Sufi doctrine of Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif was derived from the Shâdhili-Jazù1i teachings and was based on three principles: respect for the *shari'a* and the Prophet's tradition; opposition to reprehensible innovations; and veneration of the Prophet and his House ~. In fact, it was this last principle which acquired predominance, particularly after the death of the founder.

Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif himself made use of sharifism to establish his spiritual authority. He gave the *zawiya* the name of *dar ad-damana* or "the house of guarantee" signifying by such a name that whoever entered or served it would be saved from hell[48] . But it was especially under his successors that sharifism replaced the mystic way as the main connection between the *zawiya* and its followers. For as Sufi guidance weakened after the death of the founding shaykh, disciples turned into "servants of the glorious house" *(khudddan ad-dar as-sa'ida)*, and relations between the two sides acquired a patron-client nature[49]. Wazzan became a pilgrimage centre for thousands of visitors in search not so much for spiritual guidance as for the *baraka* dispensed by the *sharif-s.*

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(44) This idea has been developed by Mohamcd El-Mansour in his article entitled "Sharifian Sufism: The Religious and Social Practice of the Wazzani Zawiya", *Tribe and State - Essays in Honour of David Hart,* G. Joffe and R.Pennell (eds.), Menas Press, Wisbech, 1991, pp.69-73.

(45) Ibid., pp.79-8O.

(46) Al-Wazzani, *ar-Rawd al-munif,* Ms.K/2304, BGR, voI.II, p34.

(47) Ibid., pp.280.

(48) Al-Qadiri M., *Nashr al-Mathani,* Hajji and Tawfik (eds.), 4 vols. Rabat, 1977-86, vol. III, pp. 178-180.

(49) El-Mansour, 'Sharifian Sufism", p. 75.

The Wazzani *sharif-s* took part in the ideological consolidation of the sharifian Alawi state. Hagiographic works of the zawiya confirm the widely accepted belief among the Wazzani sharif-s and their followers that, if the temporal caliphate was exercised by the Alawi sharif-s, the higher caliphate, the spiritual one, was exercised the house of Wazzan. Indeed, in the mystical revelation of Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif, according to these works, was done in the form of *bay'a* proclaimed by the elements of the universe. While in his retreat, the founding shaykh is reported to have heard "the soil, the rocks, the plants and the trees proclaim in a clear expression: May God grant victory to our Lord Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif" (50).

Even if they considered the "spiritual caliphate" to be superior to political leadership which was limited in time, space and scope, the Wazzani sharif-s looked upon the "temporal caliphate" as a religious necessity. As a defender of the Sunna, Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif estimated that "the rectitude of the community rested on respect of the shari'a, and that this in its turn dictated obedience to the caliph (51). The Wazzani shaykh-s, therefore, gave their blessing to the ruling sultans in public prayers, exhorted the population to obey them;, and mobilized their followers and sympathizers to participate in jihad under their banners (52).

This willingness to work hand in hand with the ruling sharif-s enhanced sharifian ideology and entailed considerable advantages to the Wazzani zawiya: fiscal and administrative privileges, the authorization to found branches of the order throughout the country and even outside Morocco (53), in addition to the *hurm* sanctuary status which further increased the zawiya's popularity (54). The expansion of the Wazzani religious order to far distant places and the accumulation of wealth rendered possible by the blessing and encouragement of the Alawi sultans was crucial in the evolution of the sharifian zawiya. The successors of Mawlay Abdallah ash-Sharif had to administer the affairs of an ever expanding order and turn into managers of wealth and *baraka* which they put at the service of the Makhzan. The spiritual content of the *tariqa* suffered as a result, and the Wazzani sharif-s could not possibly maintain the cohesion and the vitality of their order without drawing upon their only lasting capital, their holy genealogy, thus participating with their Alawi cousins in the promotion of sharifian ideology.

(50) Hamdun at-Tahiri, *Tuhfat al-Ikhwan*, lith. Fes, 1906, p.39

(51) Al-Wazzani, *Ar-Rawd al-munif*, vol.II, p.186, 248-285. See also al-Tahiri, *Tuhfat*, p.20; Spillman, *Esquisse d'histoire religieuse du Maroc*, Peyronnet, Paris, 1951, p.230.

(52) Sidi Muhammad b. Abdallah ash-Sharif (d.1705), second shaykh of the zawiya, took part personally in the siege of Ceuta at the head of the Jbala tribes. His brother Ibrahim died in the course of the battle for the liberation of Larache in 1689 (al-Hawwat, *ar-Rawda*, p.144)

(53) By the end of the 18th century, the zawiya had branches in the major cities of Morocco, in Bilad al-Sudan, Algeria and the Mashriq. The first branch was founded in Fes during the lifetime of the founder (at-Tahiri, Tuhfat, p.26, 29-30, 131)

(54) The *hurm* was also the cause of the most important confrontations between the zawiya-s and the makhzan, and between the Alawi sultans and the sharif-s of Wazzan . Ibn al-Haj related in detail the confrontation between Sultan Mawlay Abdalah and the sharif of Wazzan, Mawlay at-Tayyib; see *ad-Durr*, vol.IX, Ms.1875, Z, BHR. See also ad-Duayyif, *Tarikh*, Rabat, 1986, p.151-52 and al-Wazzani, *ar-Rawd al-munif*, II, p.213.

THE SHARIFIAN MAKHZAN AND THE SHARIF-S OR POLITICAL ORDER VERSUS GENEALOGICAL ORDER

There is no doubt that the advent of the sharifian dynasties imposed a new "redistribution of the sacred"[55]. On the one hand, the various sharifian groups had to adapt themselves to a new situation in which the ruling dynasty took its legitimacy from sharifism. On the other hand, the *Sahrif-s* in power had to make sure that no other sharifian group would challenge their authority. Moreover, the ruling *Sahrif-s* had to compete with the rest of the sharifian families over a major element of legitimacy: sharifian descent and the spiritual authority *(baraka* attached to it. In order to rule undisturbed, sharifian sultans had to make sure that spiritual power remained concentrated in the person of *amir al-mumininn* and head *Sahrif.* For this purpose, they devised a sharifian policy which aimed at the same time at promoting sharifism and controlling the *sharif-s.* Started by the Marini-s, this policy was devised into a system under the Saadi-s and the *Alawi*-s. Sharifian ideology was promoted through the granting of privileges to powerful and popular sharifian groups who became the makhzan allies. The "theatrical" aspect of the state, symbolized by the *mawlid* celebrations and the *hadith* councils, was also developed to serve the same purpose. On the other hand, the ruling *Sahrif-s* kept the less powerful sharifian lineages under close supervision through the successive campaigns of checking and listing as well as through the policy of privileges which perpetuated intra-sharifian rivalries, thus contributing to weakening sharifian solidarity. With the *sharif-s* divided, the sharifian sultan could then impose himself as the major arbiter and head *sharif.*

During the l8th century, this sharifian policy manifested itself in the makhzan dealing with three main groups of *Sahrif-s:* the *sharif-s* of Fes, the Idrisi-s of Jabal al-Alam and the Alawi *sharif-s* of Tafilelt.

(a) The Sharif-s of Fes

The *sharif-s* of Fes comprise Idris I's descendants who had remained in this city after the break-up of Idrisi rule in the tenth century and these are related to the Prophet through al-Hasan , son of ‘Ali and Fatima (Hasani-s). They also included some Husayni-s or descendants of Husayn, son of ‘Ali and Fatima, who had come to Morocco through Sicily, Andalusia and Ceuta. These, however, were only a minority[56].

The *sharif-s* of Fes was the first sharifian group to be organized by the Marini sultans under whom they gained wealth and prestige[57]. With time, these families developed an *"esprit de corps"* of their own, independent of the other *Sahrif-s* of Morocco. This was made possible because of their authenticated genealogy, but also because they enjoyed state protection, economic affluence, the privilege of scholarship and urban up-bringing, and residence in the original seat of the first Moroccan sharifian

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(55) The expression *"réaménagement du sacré"* is of J. Berque, *L 'intérieur du Maghreb*, Gallimard, Paris, 1978, pp. 140-141 and 542.

(56*)* Such was the case of the Siqilliyyin, the rulers of Fatimi Sicily who moved to Andalusia in the l2th century and then from Andalusia to Ceuta. The ‘Iraqiyyin is another Husayni family which immigrated to Morocco from Irak through Andalusia; see Ibn Kha1dun, *Muqaddima, p. 254.*

(57) Kably, ‘Musahama", p. 13-14.

dynasty. Rulers sought their support and feared their *fronde* which led in 1465 to the execution of the last Marini sultan Abd al-Haqq[58].

However, if the Husayni *Sharif-s* of Fes remained the same over the centuries, the Hasani-s had continuously been enriched since the l5th century with the immigration of Idrisi-s from all over the country[59]. This was not without creating a certain tension between the Hasani-s and the Husayni-s of Fes on the one hand, and the city's old *Sharif-s* and the new arrivals on the other hand, that is between the most powerful factions *(ahl al-'asabiyya)* and the minor sharifian branches[60].

'A1a~i policy vis-à-vis this most influential sharifian group varied considerably according to makhzan relations with the city of Fes as a whole. In times of "détente", this policy consisted of weakening sharifian solidarity already undermined by factional rivalries and gaining the support of the most powerful groups. The policy of privileges was apparently sufficient by itself in order to sow dissension in the ranks of the *Sharif-s* of Fes who appeared like a heterogeneous group moved only by material interests and a yearning for makhzan favours[61]. Having undermined the a*sabiyya* of the *sharif-s* of Fes, the Alawi sultans were then able to maintain their leading role among the various sharifian families, and above All, to keep in check any inclination on the part of these *Sharif-s* to step over the line into the forbidden territory of politics. In times of confrontation with the city, however, they called upon them as fellow *sharif-s* and natural allies to face the rebellious non-sharifian population.

Sidi Muhammad's dealings with these *Sharif-s* were exemplary in this regard. Only three months' after his accession to the throne and on the occasion of his first official visit to Fes, the Sultan gave a mandate to twelve *Sharif-s,* belonging to seven of the most notable families of that city, to look into the affairs of their kinsmen, ascertain the Veracity of their claims to sharifism, and establish a list of the authenticated lineages[62]. In a sense, they were nominated *naqib-s* of the *Sharif-s* of Fes for they were authorized "to examine the old and new pedigrees and look into the claims to sharifian descent on the basis of *zahir-s,* witnesses and other types of evidence produced by the claimants"[63]. Was Fes in real need of so many *naqib-s,* or was this multiple nomination an attempt on the part of the newly acclaimed sultan to gain over an influential segment of the city's notability?

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(58) Garcia Arenal "The Revolution of Fas in 869/1465 and the Death of Sultan Abd al-Haqq al. Marini", in *Bulletin of SOAS,* XLI, 1, 1978, pp. 43-66.

(59) According to al-Hawwat, the *sharif-s* who settled in Fes were automatically exempted from all taxes and makhzan services without due verification of their sharifian claims. This seems to have encouraged the immigration of *sharif-s* into this city sec his *Qurrat al-Uyun*, Ms. K/1480, n. p.

(60) This is indeed what happened during the reign of Sidi Muhammad, as this will be seen below.

(61) See letter of Sidi Muhammad to Mawlay al-Mamun and at-Tawdi b. Suda, dated April 1787 in Ibn Zaydan, *al-Izz,* vol H, pp. 107-111.

(62) Copy of this *zahir* is reproduced from a manuscript of the Siqilli family in Fes, in F. Harrak, *"State and Religion in 18th century Morocco,* Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1989, pp. 441-442.

(63) Ibid.

It was on the basis of the investigation carried out by these twelve appointees that Sidi Muhammad granted in 1776 the Fes mortmain properties to the city's twelve most prestigious sharifian families: the Idrisi-Qaytuni, the Msefri , the Amrani, the Talibi, the Ghalibi, the Iraqi, the Siqi1li, the Dabbagh, the Kattani, the Fadili, the Tahiri and the Manuni (64). This important donation, decided less than a year after the rebellion of Fes against Sidi Muhammad's non-Quranic fiscality, suggests that one of the underlying motivation behind it might have been to win over the prestigious sharifian population[65] In doing so, however, the Sultan frustrated a number of new or less prestigious sharifian families and created divisions among the *sharif-s* who could no longer act as a coherent group.

It was only in 1787 when he was facing acute religious opposition from the scholars of Fes that Sidi Muhammad undertook to generalize this donation to ah the *Sahrif-s* residing in this city provided that they held credible genealogical credentials[66]. In fact, the Sultan's 1787 decree abrogated the 1776 *zahir* with the probable intention of restoring sharifian solidarity which by then he desperately needed. However, by removing the special privileges accorded ten years earlier to the leading families, the Sultan caused still further confusion and discontent by undermining the claims of the prestigious families who considered their lineages to be the purest[67].

(b) The Idrisi sharif-s of Jabal al-Alam

Following the end of Idrisi rule in Morocco in the tenth century, many Sharif-s took refuge in northwestern Morocco where they lived in hiding *(tasattur)* during several centuries. Marini sharifian policy encouraged many of this Idrisi-s to come forward and benefit from the privileges offered to this holy lineage[68]. Although the first surveys of Idrisi *sharif-s* go back to the end of the thirteenth century[69], it was only after the discovery of Idris Il's tomb in 1437 that these *sharif-s* were officially recognized and

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(64) This *zahir i*s reproduced in at-Tayyib at-Tahiri, *Tayyib al-Anfas*, Meknes, 1985, p. 18. The Sultan's donation was not only substantial (the dead were numerous during this period of drought and famine), but it was also permanent; whence the ensuing competition between the potential beneficiaries and the controversy over the definition of "a Fasi sharif'; see on this question az-Zayani, *Tuhfat al-Hadi*, p. 13.

(65) Another attempt on the part of Sidi Muhammad to win over the support of the sharifian population of Fes was made in the same year (1778) when he wrote a threatening letter to the population of this city "The real Fasi-s, he wrote, are the *sharif-s* in general and the descendants of Mawlay Idris in particular, in addition to the Lamtiyyn who have always served the *sharif-s* and lived with them in harmony. As for the Andalusians of Fes, they are nothing more than a heterogeneous amalgamation of Arabs, *Ajam* (non Arabs), *Rum* (Christians), Persians, former slaves, renegades and Islamized Jews. Their treacherous character was made manifest at All times and places"; az-Zayani, *Tuhfat an-Nubaha*, Ms. K/241, pp. 190-193.

(66) Letter referred to in footnote 61 above.

(67) Sulayman al-Hawwat echoed this dissatisfaction in his comment on the 1787 decision by the Sultan to generalize the donation of mortmain property; *as-Sirr*, pp. 8-9.

(68) Ibid., p. 4.

(69) The oldest available survey of the Alami *sharif-s* is dated of 1310; but there are indication that there was at least one other survey realized by the Marini sultan Sulayman (d. 1307); Kably, "Musahama", p. 17.

rehabilitated[70]. Their association, thereafter, with the Sufi movement led by al-Jazuli, an Idrisi *Sahrif* himself, enhanced their importance as a social group.

Several factors contributed to the emergence of the Idrisi-s of Jabal al-Alam on the social and political scene:

1. their geographical concentration around the shrine of one of their ancestors, Malay Abd. As-Salam b. Mshish (d. 1228), in a zone of confrontation with the Iberian infidels;

2. the distinguished place conferred upon Maw1ay Abd as-Salam by Moroccan Sufis who saw in him the “Sufi Pole” of the Islamic west and the spiritual father of Abi al-Hasan ash-Shadhili (d. 1258), founder of the Shadhili school of Sufism;

3. the leading role played by the *Sahrif-s* of Jabal al-Alam in resisting Christian incursions following the fall of Islamic Spain, a fact which emphasized their role as leaders *of jihad* and enhanced their religious prestige.

These factors made the *Sharif-s* of northwestern Morocco a powerful social force, particularity during periods of weakness of the central government when they constituted a potential political threat to the temporal power. It is no wonder then that Alawi sultans were very alert in their dealing with them, but this did not prevent these sultans from seeking the services of individual *Sharif-s* and favoring the most powerful among them[71]. The campaigns of investigation of Alami lineages further undermined their group solidarity for they led to their division into various degrees of genealogical certainty[7]. These campaigns of checking and listing served to keep the Alami *Sahrif-s* under control and confirm the sharifian sultan in his position as the ultimate guardian and protector of the holy lineages.

It was this policy, characterized at the same time by generosity and firmness, that Sultan Muhammad b. Abdallah followed with regard to the Alami *sharif-s.* At the beginning of his reign, he did ah he could to win them over. He readily renewed their decrees of *tawqir*, without questioning, thus pardoning their alliance with al-Mustadi and ar-Rifi during the *fatra* and forgiving their affront in 1757

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(70) The discovery of the tomb was apparently preceded by the appearance of the body of Idris I in his winding sheet. Such events which furthered the prestige of the *sharif-s,* were followed by a more general survey of the Idrisi-s in *1351,* by the re-institution of the *naqaba,* and by the creation of the first sharifian *zawiya* around the shrine of Idris Il in Fes in 1448; see Kably, "Mushama”, pp. 18 and 47. For a detailed analysis of the Marini sharifian policy, sec also H. Beck, *L'image d' Idris II.*

(71) The Wazzani-s, and to a lesser degree the Raysuni-s, were accorded so many privileges by the successive ‘A1a~i sultans that they practically administered *dc* areas under their influence in their name.

(72) Two major campaigns were organized by the Alawi-s up to the l8th century. The first by Mawlay Ismail and the second by Sidi Muhammad. *They led to* the elaboration of two registers of the Idrisi *sharif-s* of Morocco. The register of Mawlay lsmai1, considered as the basic reference for Alawi sultans, classified the *Sahrif-s* into 6 categories *(tabaqa-s):* the well known *sharif-s (mashahir);* those who possessed authenticated *zahir-s; those* who were in possession of contested *zahir-s;* those who possessed other documents attesting their sharifian status; claimants who presented no documents; and finally those dismissed as false claimants; sec lbn Zaydan, *al-Izz, vol.II, p. 89 quoting al Hawwat..*

when they abstained from presenting their *bay'a* and refused to open Shefshawin's gates to his governor[73]. It was only in 1761, when the tax collectors made their first round of the Jbala and Ghomara regions, that the makhzan realized that there was nothing to be taken from this population as "almost everyone had become sharifian"[74]. It was on this occasion that srdrMu1~mmad ordered yet another campaign of investigation pretending that Mawlay Ismail's register *(kunnash)* could not be found[75]. Muhammad as-Sadaq b. Raysun (d. 1820) was designated to supervise the operation and establish a new register of Alami *sharif-s*[76].

The result of this investigation was, once again, the confirmation of the privileges traditionally enjoyed by prestigious Alami lineages, particularity those who had formed an important network of clients through their *zawiya-s.* Indeed, the customary concessions were made to the Raisin-s, to which were added regular allowances allocated to students and teachers residing in the *zawiya* of Tazrut and a monthly stipend drawn from the duties on foreign trade paid to the *sharif-s* themselves as an indirect means of engaging them in favor of Sidi Muhammad's commercial policy[77]. The Wazzani-s, who had succeeded by then in recruiting followers throughout Morocco and the Islamic world at large, were made the privileged allies of the makhzan. In a special decree[78], Sidi Muhammad granted them autonomy in the management *of zawiya* affairs. They were not only exempted from all taxes and makhzan dues, but were given a *droit de regard* over the administration of the Gharb and lower Jba1a regions. Moreover, the *zawiya* shaykh, Sidi Ali b. Ahmad (d.1811), was authorized to select the chief judge of the region on behalf of the Sultan. Finally, and notwithstanding the fact that the Wazzani-s did not need makhzan financial assistance, Sidi Muhammad proposed to supplement their finances from *hubus* or makhzan sources.

This policy of *rapprochement* with some influential *sharif-s* at a time when the makhzan was entering a period of increasing tension with other religious groups[79] was a clear attempt to compromise these *sharif-s* by making them share in the benefits of Sidi Muhammad's rule.

Such an impression is reinforced by the treatment allotted to the less powerful Alami *Sharif-s (ammat al-ashraf).* After the elaboration of the new register in 1770, these were no' longer exempted from paying legal taxes which they now paid to the *shaykh-s* of their respective administrative division instead of the tax collectors. It was up to these *shaykh-s,* chosen among the *sharif-s,* to distribute the revenue drawn

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(73) Ad-Duayyif, *Tarikh,* p. 184.

(74) Az-Zayani, *Tuhfat al-Hadi,* p. 12.

(75) The Ism~'T1rRegister was apparently found later on while the survey was already under way.

(76) The Register is *Fath al-'Âlim al-Kaabir...,* Ms. 112, BUR.

(77) Ahmad al-Amen ar-Raysuni, *Haqaiq tarikhiya an zawiyat Tazrut,* Tetouan, 1966, pp. 11-24; see also Ali al-Raysuni, *Rijal wa Mawaqif,* Tetouan, 1981, p. 21.

(78) Ad-Duayyif, *Tarikh,* . 189-190.

(79) The *zawiya* of Boujad was destroyed in *1785;* the Nasiri 1odges at Bani Tuzine (Taza) in 1787, and the sultan was threatening to do the same with the mother *Nasiri zawiya* in Tamegrut. On the other hand, Sidi Muhammad was facing a head-strong resistance to his judiciary and educational reforms on the part of the religious establishment.

from these taxes to the poor and the needy among their km[80]. II was, therefore, no surprise to see these common *Sharif-s* in 1790 grant refuge to the rebellious prince Mawlay al-Yazid at a time when the Wazzani-s and Raysuni-s were employing their *baraka* in the service of the reigning Sultan.

(c) The Alawi Sharif-s

In principle, the A1awi-s constituted the support (or *shi'a)* of the Alawi dynasty. However, their concentration in the remote Toilet region and in the neighbourhood of the restless Maaqil Arabs and Ait Atta Berbers, the presence among them of numerous princes, and therefore potential claimants to the throne, and the absence of a clear and recognized rule of succession, made them a constant source of worry to Alawi sultans.

The relations of these sultans with their brethren *sharif-s* were at the same time complex and delicate. On the one hand, they had to keep an eye on them and see to it that potential claimants among them were discouraged and stopped. They also had to curb any abuse of power on their part regarding the common people. On the other hand, and by virtue of their direct blood links with the ruling family, they formed a kind of state nobility and for this reason were granted special ~privileges in the form of administrative autonomy, tax exemption and royal donations~. Moreover, and since the l7th century, sultans have reserved for themselves the prerogative of looking after the affairs of “their km”. It is no wonder then that these relations were not always smooth.

In the second half of the l8th century, Sultan Muhammad b. Abdallah was faced with the rebellion of his uncle Mawlay al-Hasan. This son of Mawlay Ismail did not extend his *bay’a* to his nephew and claimed the throne for himself. He was backed in his claim by some Tafilelt *Sharif-s* and by the neighbouring Berber and Arab tribes who saw in his cause a means of escaping taxation and makhzan control of their movements[82].

Sidi Muhammad tolerated the old man’s turbulence as long as he did not openly defy the state and as long as the rebellion was contained within tolerable limits. From time to time, he transferred some tribes which supported the rebellious prince to other parts of the country and integrated others into his army[83]. However, in 1783, the Sultan lost patience when his personal envoy to the region, al-Abbas Moreno, was insulted by the *sharif-s* and prevented from executing the mission assigned to him:

(80) Az-Zayani, *Tuhfat al-Hadi* p. 12.

(81) Ibid.

(82) Ad-Duayyif, *Tarikh* p. 192; Ibn al-Haj, *ad-Durr,* X, Ms. 1920, BHR; pp. 346 and 349.

(83) In 1760, Saharan blacks *(haratin)* belonging to the Jebabra, Maarka and Ulad Buhammu tribes were moved from Tafilelt to Meknes and their youth integrated into the army. In 1777, the Chebanate, dispersed by Mawlay ar-Rashid (1664-72) were assembled in Marrakech and made into a *Gish* tribe. Finally, in 1783, the Ait Mbak *haratin* were also integrated into the army (Ibn al-Haj, *ad-Durr,* X, pp. 67, *294-955,* and 348).

establishing the *maks* in the local markets[84]. Sidi Muhammad was not so much angered by the *sharif-s* rejection of the *maks* as by their public challenge to a representative of the state. This he could not tolerate, as he explained in a menacing letter he addressed to the *Sharif-s* after this incident~. The Sultan promised, nevertheless, to look into their grievances "within the family"[86].

It seems, however, that the letter did not fulfil its purpose as Sidi Muhammad began to fear a possible alliance between Mawlay al-Hasan and other opposition movements in the country, notably that of Mawlay al-Yazid. Indeed, favoured by a long period of drought and the dissatisfaction generated by Sidi Muhammad's non-Quranic fiscality, his diplomatic and commercial opening up to the Christian world, and encouraged by the example of al-Yazid, Mawlay al-Hasan became still more active in the Tafilelt[87].

Alarmed by this new situation, the Sultan resolved to flip the rising in the bud. As soon as the drought was definitely over, he assembled a formidable army which he led personally against Mawlay al-Hasan and his party[88]. In Tafilelt, he first dealt with the focal point of the rebellion by exiling Mawlay al-Hasan from his popular base to Meknes where he could be more closely guarded. He then sent off his army to collect the taxes from the tribes who had been Mawlay al-Hasan's protected clients and recruit their youths into the army[89]. The next decision was the appointment of one of his most trusted servants Abu al-Qasim az-Zayani as governor of Tafilelt. At the same time, he ordered his sons to reside in Tafilelt which thus became a sort of "cage" for the potential claimants to the throne[90]. With the appointment of a makhzan agent as governor, the relative administrative and financial autonomy of the Alawi sharif-s in Tafilelt came to an end. The Alawi-s were from then on treated like the rest of the sharifian population of Morocco. Financial and administrative autonomy was replaced by a regular and substantial royal donation distributed by the makhzan representative[91]. The interests and social prestige of the AIawi-s, like those of the other Moroccan *sharif-s*, became thus dependent on the sultan's generosity.

CONCLUSION

The importance acquired by sharifism since the l5th century as a principle of both religious and political legitimacy induced the Alawi sultans to mobilize it in favour of the central state which

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(84) See ad-Duayyif, *Tarikh*, p. 176.

(85) After this incident, the Sultan wrote a strong-worded letter to the Alawi sharif-s where he threatened to march on Tafilelt if similar slurs were cast on the state; ibid.

(86)Ibid.

(87) Ibid., p. 192; Ibn al-Haj, *al-Durr*, X, p. 349.

(88) Ad-Duayyif, *Tarikh*, p. 192.

(89) Ibid.

(90) This term *(qafas)* was indeed used by Mawlay Sulayman (1792-1822) to describe Tafilelt; see his letter to Muhammad as-Sadiq b. Raysun in Dawud, Tarikh *Titwan*, Tetouan, *1956-1970*, vol. II, pp. 205-206.

(91) Az-Zayani, *ar-Rawda as-Sulaymaniya*, Ms.K/1275, BGR, p. 158.

they sought to strengthen. They did so by acting as protectors of the holy lineage and as arbiters in sharifian affairs. In this way, they set out to turn the *sharif-s* into an aristocracy of blood and moral virtue for the benefit of the ruling dynasty. Sulayman al-Hawwat, a *naqib* of the Alami *sharif-s,* could therefore describe Sidi Muhammad's sharifian policy as follows:

He imitated his father's preference *(tashayyu')* for *ahl al-bayt.* He treated them along the tradition of the kings of Persia[92] who observed their •traditional privileges, and prevented them from social debasement through practicing demeaning crafts or marrying unworthy parties, for the excellence of such a distinguished group and its sanctified quintessence served to enhance the splendour of the state[93]

Obviously, the *tashayyu'* of Sidi Muhammad or that of his father was not a matter of creed or dogma but rather a pragmatic *tashayyu',* since it aimed at promoting the sharifian cubit as an ideological support for their political authority. By converting the *sharif-s* into an aristocracy which largely depended on the sharifian sultan for its livelihood and social status and by imposing the sultan as the protector and arbiter of sharifian affairs, Sidi Muhammad wanted not only to guarantee the attachment and allegiance of this highly influential group, but also to strengthen the politico-religious authority of the sultan at the expense of other claimants to religious legitimacy, namely the *sharif-s, 'ulama* and *Murabit-s.*

However, if the *tashayyu* of the Alawi sultans aimed at "enhancing the splendour of the state", the reverence that Sufis and religious scholars had for *ahl al-bayt* was motivated by the ideological hegemony the *sharif-s* enjoyed in society, being the most concrete link with the Prophet and the natural guardians of his *Sunna.* Strangely enough, this ideological influence was not the result of an independent effort by the *sharif-s* as a distinct social group; it was rather the outcome of a complex historical development to which *'ulama*, Sufis and makhzan contributed and which led to the emergence of sharifism as the legitimizing norm in society.

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(92) Al-Hawwat is probably referring here to the privileged status of ahl 'Ali in *Shi'i* Persia.

(93) Al-Hawwat, *as-Sirr*, p. *5.*